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1.  INTRODUCTION 
While many contemporary observers tend to believe that today‟s tax policies are at best 
erratic, historians of fiscal systems are more optimistic and believe to perceive a systematic 
development in the very long term. Joseph A. Schumpeter is the first to be credited of 
having developed a fiscal stage model, followed by E. Ladwig Petersen and Kersten Krüger. 
Recently, William M. Ormrod and Richard Bonney reformulated and refined these models. 
In this paper we present revenue data for three of the most important early modern 
German states in order to assess to what extent the development of the revenue shares in 
these countries fits to the Bonney-Ormrod model. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we will discuss the stage models of the 
aforementioned authors. Section 3 is devoted to conceptual issues, in particular how the 
revenues should be categorized. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section 
4 and 5, respectively.  
2.  STAGE MODELS OF FISCAL SYSTEMS 
Shortly before the end of World War I, the Austrian economist Joseph A. Schumpeter 
published an article titled “The Crisis of the Tax State” in which he developed a three stage 
model to describe the development of fiscal systems.1 For antiquity, he used the term 
“domain state” which degenerated into a “domain economy” in the Middle Ages. Increasing 
military costs forced the sovereigns in the Early Modern to pile up debts. To serve the 
debts, they expanded the tax system which soon became the backbone of their finances: the 
“tax state” had evolved. For Schumpeter, “„tax‟ has so much to do with „state‟ that the 
expression „tax state‟ might almost be considered a pleonasm.”2 Schumpeter‟s model is 
generally seen as the starting point for fiscal stage models, though other authors like Gustav 
Schmoller had formulated similar ideas four decades earlier.3 
Schumpeter‟s concept of the domain state and the tax state—his subtle discrimination 
between the ancient domain state and the medieval domain economy is usually blurred—was 
particularly advocated by the Danish economic historian E. Ladwig Petersen who found it 
                                                          
1 J.A. SCHUMPETER, Die Krise des Steuerstaates, in “Zeitfragen aus dem Gebiet der Soziologie”, 4, 1918, pp. 3-
74; English translation IDEM, The Crisis of the Tax State, in “International Economic Papers”, 4, 1954, pp. 5-38. 
2 Ibid., p. 19. 
3 E.g., G. SCHMOLLER, Die Epochen der preußischen Finanzpolitik, in “Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung 
und Volkswirthschaft”, 1, 1877, pp. 33-114, here p. 113. In generalising the Prussian development, Schmoller 
distinguished the tribute economy, the domain economy, the regal economy and the tax economy. 
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very fruitful for analysing Scandinavian and German fiscal history.4 In a further step, the 
German historian Kersten Krüger elaborated criteria that characterise the domain state and 
the tax state, respectively.5  
This in turn has inspired Richard Bonney, who ran a large and extremely successful 
research project on medieval and early modern fiscal history in the late 1980s and early 
1990s,6 to extend the model with a colleague in medieval history, William M. Ormrod. 
Bonney and Ormrod distinguish four stages in fiscal history: the tribute state, the domain 
state, the tax state and the fiscal state. Their most important achievement is that they also 
model the transition from one stage to the following. Concerning the dynamics, they 
discern crises, which by definition occur within fiscal systems, fiscal revolutions that move a 
fiscal system from one stage to another, and self-sustained growth, which is what drives the 
fiscal system of the modern fiscal state.7 
One of the virtues of the Bonney-Ormrod model is that its explicit formulation allows 
to test it empirically. Bonney and Ormrod adopt the 16 citeria proposed by Krüger and add 
another two.8 Although they do not make explicit which criteria they consider to be of 
essential importance, the very fact that they stick to the notions created by Schumpeter—
”domain state”, “tax state”—indicate that the revenue structure is of pivotal importance in 
their stage model.9 Hence we will focus the analysis on the revenue structure of the most 
important German states. 
3.  CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Figure 1 illustrates central Europe in the borders of 1789. Apart from the Habsburg 
Monarchy, the largest German states were Brandenburg-Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria.  
In order to analyse the revenue structure of these states, we need both data on total 
revenues and on the shares of domanial and tax revenues, at least for a number of 
benchmark years. In view of the economic and social incidence of the tax burden it might 
also be helpful to distinguish between revenues from direct taxes and revenues from 
indirect taxes.10 
                                                          
4 E.L. PETERSEN, From Domain State to Tax State. Synthesis and Interpretation, in “Scandinavian Economic 
History Review”, 23, 1975, pp. 116-148. 
5  K. KRÜGER, Gerhard Oestreich und der Finanzstaat. Entstehung und Deutung eines Epochenbegriffs der frühneuzeitlichen 
Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte, in “Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte”, 33, 1983, pp. 333-346; English 
version IDEM, Public Finance and Modernisation: The Change from the Domain State to Tax State in Hesse in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeeth Centuries, in Wealth and Taxation in Central Europe. The History and Sociology of Public Finance, ed. P.-C. WITT, 
Leamington Spa et al. 1987 (Berg), pp. 49-62. 
6  Economic Systems and State Finance, ed. R. BONNEY, Oxford 1995 (Clarendon); The Rise of the Fiscal State in 
Europe, c. 1200-1815, ed. IDEM, Oxford 1999 (Oxford University Press); see also his European State Finance 
Database, http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/ (accessed 25 June 2007). 
7  R. BONNEY, W.M. ORMROD, Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth: Towards a Conceptual Model of Change 
in Fiscal History, in Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth, W.M. ORMROD, M. BONNEY, R. BONNEY eds., 
Stamford 1999 (Shaun Tyas), pp. 1-20. 
8  Cf. K. KRÜGER, Public Finance, cit., p. 52; R. BONNEY, W.M. ORMROD, Crises, cit., pp. 4-8. 
9  Cf. for the importance of revenues for their model ibid., pp. 10, 16, and R. BONNEY, Revenues, in Economic 
Systems, cit., pp. 423-505, here p. 451. 
10  Cf. the seminal paper of P. MATHIAS, P.K. O‟BRIEN, Taxation in Britain and France, 1715-1810. A 
Comparison of the Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the Central Governments, in “Journal of European 
Economic History”, 5, 1976, pp. 601-650. For a taxonomy of public revenues in pre-modern times, see M. 
KÖRNER, Steuern und Abgaben in Theorie und Praxis im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit, in Steuern, Abgaben und 
Dienste vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart, ed. E. SCHREMMER, Stuttgart 1994 (Steiner), pp. 53-75. 
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Figure 1.  Political Borders in Central Europe, 1789 
 
Note: Arrows indicate exclaves. 
Source:  IEG Maps (www.ieg-maps.uni-mainz.de), accessed 19 June 2007.  
As numerous scholars working on fiscal revenues in the Early Modern had to realise, it 
is difficult to find complete budget data. The most obvious reason is that the princes usually 
did not discriminate between revenues from their domains and regalian rights on the one 
hand and „state‟ taxes on the other hand. Moreover, in most states a number of institutions 
co-existed that were charged with collecting rents, taxes, fees etc. Only extraordinary 
circumstances forced the princes to undertake fiscal surveys covering both personal and 
state revenues. The German case is further complicated by the fact that the nation state did 
not evolve before the late nineteenth century. An immense number of independent 
sovereigns and endless territorial disputes and changes complicate efforts to get an overview 
of „German‟ fiscal history before the mediatisation of the early nineteenth century. 
Fortunately, since the last third of the nineteenth century the evolving academic field of 
public economics has produced a quite large literature. Most of these works were published 
before World War II when many archival documents fell victim to aerial bombing and 
devastation. 
The analysis of the few surviving and complete early modern budgets, however, is not 
without caveats. Usually even the officials charged with conducting and monitoring the 
revenue collection did not have full overview. Several centuries later, only a few historians 
were able to penetrate the complicated multitude of treasuries. And even then they often 
confined their historical account to reproducing budget items which too often do not allow 
to identify the character of the revenue items, i.e. whether they originated from domains or 
were tax revenues. 
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In the following we analyse the literature on the revenue structures of Brandenburg-
Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria. Whenever we were able to classify the revenue items in the 
reported budgets satisfactorily,11 we subsumed them in the following four categories: 
1. “Public operating surplus” summarises all kind of net revenues that emerge from 
princely and public economic activities beyond mere tax- or fee-collecting. Typical 
items are revenues from domains and forests, but also from regalian rights like 
revenues from mines, salines or other monopolies. A conceptual problem is that 
these revenues are either reported in gross or in net terms. Net revenues (≈ profits) 
are gross revenues (≈ turnover) less costs such as raw materials, intermediate 
products, wages and other inputs. The difference between gross and net revenues 
can be quite large, especially if the products were sold on markets in which the 
sovereign did not have monopolistic power. As we are interested in the financial 
scope that emerged for the sovereign or state, net figures are more meaningful. 
Fortunately, many reported budget items followed the net concept or allow to 
subtract costs from gross revenues.12   
In this respect, it should be noted that the economic effect of the public operating 
surplus is very similar to that of an ad valorem consumption tax.13 One might thus 
be tempted to regard it as a sort of “indirect indirect tax”.14 
2. “Direct taxes” are compulsory payments to public or quasi-public authorities 
which are paid directly and the shifting of which is assumed to be quite unlikely. 
Typical early modern direct taxes are land and other real property taxes, poll taxes, 
but also income taxes etc. Trade taxes are also classified as direct taxes if the tax 
amount does not vary with the output. 
3. “Indirect taxes” are compulsory payments to public or quasi-public authorities 
which are paid by persons who are assumed to shift the burden to the intended 
taxpayer. Typical indirect taxes are customs, excises, stamp taxes, user fees etc. 
Typical production taxes, i.e. taxes which vary with the output, also fall under this 
category.  
For both direct and indirect taxes, the difference between gross and net revenues 
amounts to only a few per cent. Usually net revenues were reported in the budgets. 
4. “Other” revenues is a residual category in which fall all revenues from other 
sources. Also included are small budget items which could not be attributed to one 
of the other three categories. 
For a number of reasons we do not consider debt here.15 First, in the early modern 
borrowing was a discretionary measure. As we are interested in structural changes, in 
particular regarding tax revenue shares on the one hand and the public operating surplus on 
                                                          
11  Very helpful in this respect proved W. SCHOMBURG, Lexikon der deutschen Steuer- und Zollgeschichte. Abgaben, 
Dienste, Gebühren, Steuern und Zölle von den Anfängen bis 1806, Munich 1992 (C.H. Beck). 
12  From today‟s point of view one should also subtract the imputed owner‟s salary and should take account 
of the opportunity costs of capital input. Contemporaries, however, were normally not aware of this concept. 
Moreover, this deduction would usually amount to not more than some 5 per cent of gross revenues. Hence this 
point is ignored.  
13  R. FREMDLING, Freight Rates and State Budget: the Role of the National Prussian Railways 1880-1913, in “Journal 
of European Economic History”, 9, 1980, pp. 21-39, here p. 30. 
14  M. SPOERER, Steuerlast, Steuerinzidenz und Steuerwettbewerb. Verteilungswirkungen der Besteuerung in Preußen und 
Württemberg (1815-1913), Berlin 2004 (Akademie), p. 106. 
15  Cf. M. KÖRNER, Steuern, cit., p. 67; M.A. DENZEL, Öffentliche Wirtschaft in Bayern im Spätmittelalter und im 18. 
Jahrhundert. Erwerbswirtschaftliche Einnahmen und Investitionen der Landsherren nach Staatshaushalten des Herzogtums 
Niederbayern Bayern-Landshut) und des Kurfürstentums Bayern, in Öffentliches und privates Wirtschaften in sich wandelnden 
Wirtschaftsordnungen, ed. J. SCHNEIDER, Stuttgart 2001 (Steiner), pp. 83-120, here p. 85. 
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the other, borrowing data that only appear in one benchmark year but not in the following 
would distort the picture. Second, as borrowing is simply anticipated taxation, debt matters 
for the taxpayer only when it comes to paying taxes to finance interest and redemption. 
4.  THE RESULTS 
4.1.  Electorate Saxony 
Next to the Habsburg monarchy and Brandenburg-Prussia, the electorate Saxony was 
in terms of population Germany‟s third largest state in the eighteenth century. In Germany, 
fiscal history has experienced a kind of revival in the past decade. The fiscal history of 
Saxony, hitherto neglected, has profited in particular from recent scholarly work, so that the 
data situation is quite satisfactory. Uwe Schirmer collected tax data for the period from the 
late fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries.16 In the mid-eighteenth century, the 
Saxonian revenues were collected by no less than three different treasuries—Rentkammer, 
Steuerhauptkammer, Generalakzisekammer—which concentrated, by and large, on the public 
operating surplus, direct taxes and indirect taxes, respectively. A fourth was added in 1773, 
the Generalhauptkasse, which also administered direct taxes. Quite complicated transfers 
between these institutions render the financial analysis difficult. A recent monograph by 
Gunda Ulbricht, however, has clarified the issue.17 After 1767, the next benchmark year is 
the average of the fiscal years 1809 to 1812, years in which Saxony suffered from the 
Napoleonic wars. In 1815, Saxony had to cede 57 per cent of her territory and 43 per cent 
of her population to Prussia.18 
                                                          
16  U. SCHIRMER, Die Finanzen im Kurfürstentum Sachsen (1553-1586), in Finanzen und Herrschaft. Materielle 
Grundlagen fürstlicher Politik in den habsburgischen Ländern und im Heiligen Römischen Reich im 16. Jahrhundert, F. 
EDELMAYER, M. LANZINNER, P. RAUSCHER eds., Vienna-Munich 2003 (Oldenbourg), pp. 143-185, here p. 184; 
IDEM, Kursächsische Staatsfinanzen (1456-1656): Strukturen, Verfassung, Funktionseliten, Leipzig 2006 (Verlag der 
Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), p. 853. 
17  G. ULBRICHT, Finanzgeschichte Sachsens im Übergang zum konstitutionellen Staat (1763 bis 1843), St. Katharinen 
2001 (Scripta Mercaturae). 
18  Ibid., p. 24. 
MARK SPOERER 786 
Figure 2.  Revenue Structure in Saxony, 1478-1844 
 
Notes:  Benchmark years are 1559, 1568, 1584, 1621, 1640, 1650, 1767, 1819, 1844 and averages for the years 
1478-82, 1492-1508, 1508-12, 1514-22, 1532-40, 1595-1601, 1602-04, 1611-14 and 1809-12. Split between direct 
taxes and  indirect taxes not available prior to 1611.  
Sources:  1478-1650 U. SCHIRMER, Finanzen, cit., p. 184, IDEM, Kursächsische Staatsfinanzen, cit., p. 922; 1767-1844 G. 
ULBRICHT, Finanzgeschichte Sachsens, cit., pp. 18f., 25, 34, 111, 120-133. 
Until the mid-seventeenth century, the structure of the Saxonian revenues follows the 
trend predicted by the Bonney-Ormrod model: the share of the tax revenues increases and 
that of the public operating surplus decreases from nearly 80 per cent around 1510 to 
exactly 10 per cent in 1640. This trend was only partially driven by the fate of the Saxonian 
silver and copper mines which lost their economic importance in the early seventeenth 
century.19 
From the perspective of the Bonney-Ormrod model, the data show a somewhat 
unexpected trend since the second half of the eighteenth century, when the share of the 
public operating surplus recovered rather than decreased, as the model predicts. This 
cannot be explained by a disproportionate loss of domains etc. in 1815. Measured in 
average revenues of the years from 1809 to 1812, Saxony kept 52.5 per cent of her public 
operating surplus. This trend was not even reversed in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, when the share of the public operating surplus increased further between 1819 and 
1844, from 33 to 40 per cent. There are some uncertainties in the 1819 budget, especially a 
quite large amount of “extraordinary revenues” which we allocated to “other revenues”. 
                                                          
19  U. SCHIRMER, Kursächsische Staatsfinanzen, cit., pp. 757-759 
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Yet, in any case the share of the public operating surplus in 1844 was still nearly twice as 
large as in 1767 and four times larger than in 1640.  
4.2.  Electorate Bavaria 
In terms of availability of data, the case of Bavaria (electorate since 1623) is less 
satisfactory. Here we are able to report revenue data for three benchmark years prior to 
1803, the earliest being 1724. At that time, Bavaria had only two treasuries, the Hofzahlamt 
and the Kriegszahlamt. While the former administered primarily the domains and other 
operations belonging to the elector, the latter controlled most of the tax revenues, both 
from direct and indirect taxes. A third treasury was added in 1728, the Schuldentilgungskasse.20 
Figure 3.  Revenue Structure in Bavaria, 1724 to 1852 
 
Notes: Benchmark years are 1724, 1777, 1792, 1800, and averages for the years 1763-72, 1825-31 and 1849-55. 
Sources:  1724 calculated from L. HOFFMANN, Geschichte der directen Steuern in Baiern vom Ende des XIII. bis zum Beginn 
des XIX. Jahrhunderts. Ein finanzgeschichtlicher Versuch, Leipzig 1883 (Duncker & Humblot), pp. 134, 139; 1763-72 
M.A. DENZEL, Öffentliche Wirtschaft, cit., p. 93; 1777, 1792 and 1800 [F. v. Krenner], Baierischer Finanz-Zustand in den 
Jahren 1777, 1792, 1798, 1799 und 1800, Munich 1803 (Hübschmann); 1831 K.F. HOHN, Grundriß der Statistik des 
Königreichs Bayern, Bamberg 1833 (Dresch), pp. 89, 91; 1852; F.W. v. REDEN, Allgemeine vergleichende Finanz-Statistik. 
Vergleichende Darstellung des Haushalts, Abgabewesens und der Schulden Deutschlands und des übrigen Europa, I/1, Darmstadt 
1851 (Jonghans), pp. 20, 22. 
                                                          
20  Cf. E. KLEIN, Geschichte der öffentlichen Finanzen in Deutschland (1500-1870), Wiesbaden 1974 (Steiner), pp. 64-65. 
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The U-shaped revenue structure of eighteenth century Bavaria resembles that of 
Saxony in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The share of the public operating 
surplus fell from 45 per cent in 1724 to 26 per cent in 1777. Thereafter, the trend 
temporarily reversed, and the share of the public operating surplus climbed to 38 per cent in 
the late 1820s. The most important operations in this respect were the salines, which 
continued to contribute large and increasing surpluses, and, later in the nineteenth century, 
a new public monopoly, the railways. 
4.3.  Electorate Brandenburg/Kingdom Prussia 
The Borussophile German historiography has produced a vast amount of studies on 
Brandenburg-Prussia. Quite a number of them were devoted to fiscal issues, especially in 
the decades prior to World War I. Hence we have quite satisfactory data for the period after 
the Thirty Years War.  
Figure 4.  Revenue Structure in Brandenburg-Prussia, 1653 to 1913 
 
Notes: Benchmark years are 1653, 1662, 1671, 1678, 1687, 1713, 1740, 1778, 1800, 1821, 1857, 1869, 1876, 1883, 
1895, 1902 and 1913. Split between direct and indirect taxes in 1713 extrapolated from values in adjacent 
benchmark years. 
Sources:  1653-1687 A.F. RIEDEL, Der Brandenburgisch-Preussische Staatshaushalt in den beiden letzten Jahrhunderten, Berlin 
1866 (Ernst & Korn), appendices III to VI; 1713 E. SCHREMMER, Taxation and Public Finance: Britain, France, and 
Germany, in Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 8, Cambridge 1989 (Cambridge University Press), pp. 315-494, here 
p. 415; 1740 A.F. BÜSCHING, Zuverlässige Beyträge zu der Regierungs-Geschichte Königs Friedrich II. von Preußen: vornehmlich 
in Ansehung der Volksmenge, des Handels, der Finanzen und des Kriegsheers. Mit einem historischen Anhang, Hamburg 1790 
(Bohn), pp. 311-312, 316; 1778 W.O. HENDERSON, Studies in the Economic Policy of Frederick the Great, London 1963 
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(Cass), p. 66; 1800 and 1821 F.W. v. REDEN, Allgemeine vergleichende Finanz-Statistik, cit., II.2, Darmstadt 1856 
(Jonghans), pp. 76-77, 80, 88; 1857-1913 M. SPOERER, Steuerlast, cit., pp. 108-109. 
Figure 4 shows that the revenue shares fluctuated wildly between mid-seventeenth 
century and early twentieth century Prussia. The tremendous fall of the share of the public 
operating surplus in the 1670s is a consequence of increasing tax pressure. In the 1650s and 
1660s the Great Elector was able to achieve that the land tax (contribution) which until 
then had only been levied (and conceded by the reluctant estates) in times of war, became a 
permanent tax to finance his army, which came into full effect in the 1670s. In the first half 
of the eighteenth century, however, the domain revenues gained shares again, and it is 
certainly premature to call eighteenth century Prussia a “tax state”.21 Brandenburg‟s electors 
(kings “in” Prussia since 1701) were quite successful to add new domains following a series 
of territorial gains, especially in Silesia.22 Although, in the end, Prussia profited enormously 
from the Napoleonic wars (after having been defeated in 1806), the country was deeply 
indebted after the Congress of Vienna. Thus the tax burden increased heavily in the years 
after 1815 while domain surpluses receded due to the depression in agriculture in the 1820s 
and mid-1830s.  
The share of the public operating surplus increased anew after the mid of the nineteenth 
century. This is due to a number of factors. Public monopolies like the Prussian postal services 
became increasingly profitable. Moreover, Prussia nationalised most of the railways in the 
1870s. In the following decades, the Prussian state railways became the largest German 
enterprise and amassed tremendous profits. The Prussian chancellor Bismarck used the 
railways‟ operating surplus to finance public expenditure. As he was in conflict with parliament 
which was not willing to consent to new taxes without political concessions, the railway profits 
were a comfortable extra-parliamentary substitute for tax revenues.23 
5.  DISCUSSION 
This short survey of the revenue structure of Germany‟s largest states (except the 
Habsburg lands) has shown that the German experience, at least that of Saxony and 
Brandenburg-Prussia, is hardly compatible with the Bonney-Ormrod model. This model 
predicts the transition from a domain state to a tax state and thus an increasing dominance 
of tax revenues over domanial and regalian revenues (or the public operating surplus, our 
preferred notion). As far as Saxony and Brandenburg-Prussia are concerned, this is not the 
case. With respect to late-nineteenth century Prussia a historian even termed this process 
the transition to a “railway state”.24 
                                                          
21  R. BONNEY, W.M. ORMROD, Crises, cit., p. 12. R. BONNEY, Revenues, cit., pp. 461-463, cites figures for the 
split of total revenues that deviate from the ones presented here. He relies on literature on Prussia written in 
English for which the question discussed here was of secondary importance. Hence the data quoted in that 
literature is partly unreliable, especially if one compares the figures of F.L. CARSTEN, The Origins of Prussia, Oxford 
1954 (Clarendon), p. 266, with that of the original source in K. BREYSIG, Der brandenburgische Staatshaushalt in der 
zweiten Hälfte des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts, in “Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirthschaft im 
Deutschen Reich”, 16, 1892, pp. 1-46, 449-520, here pp. 6-7 and 520. 
22  Cf. P. BAUMGART, The Annexation and Integration of Silesia into the Prussian State of Frederick the Great, in 
Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe, ed. M. GREENGRASS, London 1991 (Arnold), 
pp. 155-181, here p. 165. 
23  Cf. R. FREMDLING, Freight Rates, cit.; M. SPOERER, The Political Economy of Taxation in 19th Century Germany, 
in Taxation, State and the Civil Society in Germany and the United States, 1750-1950, A. NÜTZENADEL, C. STRUPP eds., 
Wiesbaden 2007 (Nomos), pp. 51-65. 
24  A. THIER, Steuergesetzgebung und Staatsfinanzen in Preußen 1871-1893, in Staatsfinanzen, Staatsverschuldung, 
Staatsbankrotte in der europäischen Staaten- und Rechtsgeschichte, ed. G. LINGELBACH, Cologne et al. 2000 (Böhlau), pp. 
311-333, here p. 316. 
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What does this imply for the Bonney-Ormrod model? On the surface, not much. It is 
in the very nature of a model that it generalises, and thus it is not too surprising to find 
exceptions. Compared to France or England, Bavaria, Saxony and even Brandenburg-
Prussia were of secondary importance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
The empirical observations presented here might be interpreted twofold. On the one 
hand, if they remain the only exceptions or form part of a small club of countries that do 
not fit the model, one can argue that they indeed are exceptions in the sense of the word. In 
other words, finding a small number of deviating case studies is not sufficient to reject the 
whole model, which would mean to forego carelessly the conceptual advantages any model 
has, in particular the function of a common platform for discussion. This qualification, 
however, would imply that we have another German sonderweg and would call for 
explanations why the German states differed. 
Table 1.  Revenue Shares of European States in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century 
(in Per Cent) 
 Non-tax  Direct taxes Indirect taxes 
Brandenburg-Prussia 1778 51 22 27 
Bavaria 1777 26 45 29 
Saxony 1767 21 51 27 
Württemberg 1733-36 68 20 12 
Poland 1782-84 62   0 37 
Salzburg 1770 51 34 14 
Hanover 1750s and 1760s 48 26 25 
Austria-Hungary 1794 45 33 22 
Brunswick/Wolfenbüttel 1750 to 1770s 45 31 24 
Hamburg 1765-66 44 30 26 
Habsburg lands 1773 38 41 21 
Hildesheim 1766 37 61   2 
Kleve-Mark-Moers 1757-58 36 43 21 
Brandenburg-Prussia 1765-66 31 32 38 
Bavaria 1777 27 47 26 
Sweden 1780s   6 56 38 
Britain 1755   2 18 80 
France 1780   4 41 55 
Sources:  Upper Panel Figures 2 to 4, lower panels M. KÖRNER, Steuern, cit., pp. 73-74; C. ZACHLOD, Staatsfinanzen, 
cit., p. 282. 
What they did, indeed. Martin Körner compiled a large list of mid-European states for 
which he was able to distinguish the revenues from direct taxes, indirect taxes and non-tax 
sources, the latter being very similar to our concept of the public operating surplus. Table 1 
reproduces Körner‟s data for the second half of the eighteenth century, together with 
similar data assembled by Christian Zachlod. This table underlines the much higher 
importance of non-tax revenues in the mid-European states as compared to the nation 
states France, Britain and Sweden. 
On the other hand, the deviating mid-European experience might highlight deficiencies 
of the model that either need to be overcome by revising the model so that it fits the mid-
European experience (or part of it) as well, or that lead to the rejection of the model 
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altogether—notabene, not because there are exceptions, but because their analysis might 
point to fundamental deficiencies of the model. This question will not be resolved here. In 
the following, we list a few points that might help to revise the Bonney-Ormrod model. 
The deviating mid-European experience, especially Saxony and Brandenburg-Prussia‟s 
jigsaw trajectory, highlights the teleological character of the Bonney-Ormrod stage model.25 
What criteria must be fulfilled for a transition from one stage to another (domain state, tax 
state, fiscal state), or more precisely, from one stage to the following to have taken place? Is 
a rebound possible, and why? The transition from one stage to the following needs a 
theoretical foundation. Bonney and Ormrod themselves rightly state that “we no longer 
need just more „facts‟. We need a more sophisticated framework of reference to which we 
may relate the new evidence that becomes available.”26 
Why does the transition from one stage to the next necessarily need a fiscal revolution? 
The only case presented here that does not clearly contradict the Bonney-Omrod model, 
Bavaria, may have had a kind of bureaucratic revolution around 1800 which is usually 
attributed to Count Montgelas, an advisor of the Bavarian elector. But the fiscal 
consequence of this revolution from above was, at least temporarily for three decades, an 
increase of the public operating surplus, not only in absolute, but also in relative terms. 
Moreover, the notion of a fiscal revolution in the sense of Bonney and Ormrod runs danger 
of being a tautology: we define the transition from one stage to the next a fiscal revolution, 
and we hypothesise that a fiscal revolution is required for the transition.  
This leads to the question whether we are really able to identify stages in fiscal history, 
that is levels of temporary and consecutive steady states which are distinguishable from each 
other. The jigsaw pattern of the Saxonian and Brandenburg-Prussian experiences (Figures 2 
and 4) casts doubts on this optimism. By insisting on stages, the Bonney-Ormrod model 
runs danger of experiencing the fate of Walt Rostow‟s take-off concept27 to which hardly 
anybody still adheres today. 
Returning to the development of the revenue shares, one feature of the German 
experience is striking, the surge of the public operating surplus in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. A closer inspection of the budgets would probably reveal that this 
surge was due to the agricultural, transport and communication “revolutions” of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The increasing spread of scientific agricultural 
knowledge helped to render the domains more efficient. The state, at least in Germany, was 
successful in expanding its activities in key economic sectors and organizing them in the 
form of monopolies. Postal services, an activity in princely hands since centuries, expanded 
enormously. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the emerging telecommunication 
sector (telegraph, telephone) as well as the transport of energy required technologies that 
came along with decreasing average costs. Similarly, building up a railway network also came 
close to a natural monopoly, an ideal pretext for state intervention. The German states were 
eager to monopolize these new fields of activity and thus tapped new resources of non-tax 
revenues. It appears that at least this aspect has been severely underestimated by the 
Bonney-Ormrod model. 
                                                          
25  A point that R. BONNEY, W.M. ORMROD, Crises, cit., p. 12, probably would reject. 
26  Ibid., p. 3. 
27  W.W. ROSTOW, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge 1960 (Cambridge 
University Press). 
